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Abstract  
This paper explores the determinants of FDI into FDI least recipient regions. Panel 
data for 20 Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and 11 Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
countries are used for the period 2000 – 2012. Findings of the fixed effects estimations 
suggest that FDI inflows into these regions are influenced by GDP per capita, infrastructure 
development, trade openness, and control of corruption. Conversely, inflation negatively 
affects FDI inflows and rents from natural resources do not significantly influence FDI. 
Furthermore, the findings show that marginal benefits from any increase in the quantity of 
FDI determinants (with the exception of control of corruption) will be less for SSA countries. 
The paper concludes with important policy implications deduced from the findings.  
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1 Introduction 
   Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) receive the 
lowest levels of FDI inflows in the world with the SSA and the MENA regions receiving 
around 2% and 5% respectively of all global FDI inflows (WDI, 2015). The poor record of 
FDI flows into these regions is surprising considering the quality and quantity of natural 
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resources and their strategic location. It is often argued that the high levels of instability and 
corruption, weak governance, and poor quality infrastructure account for their inability to 
attract FDI (Kandiero and Chitiga, 2006). However, over the last couple of years efforts have 
been focussed on attracting more FDI. For example, in the late 1980s the MENA countries 
began a significant shift toward trade and FDI openness and the creation of an environment 
that is more favourable to FDI and exports (AbuAl-Foul and Soliman, 2008). In Sub-Saharan 
Africa, structural adjustment programmes were also introduced to attract investment after 
years of policies that deterred foreign investment due to fears that this would result in a loss 
of political sovereignty, a negative impact on domestic firms and economic degradation with 
respect to the natural resource sectors (Dupasquier and Osakwe, 2006). 
   Tables 1 and 2 report levels of FDI inflows across different periods. In Table 1 it is clear 
that both SSA and the MENA regions received very little FDI prior to the 1980s. However, 
the 1980s have seen a significant shift in flows particularly for the MENA region. In Table 2 
(Panel A) it is also clear that the countries in SSA have received by far the lowest amount of 
inward investment in the latter period, followed by the MENA countries. Interestingly, the 
coefficient of variation for all regions, with the exception of Europe and Central Asia, is very 
similar suggesting that the dispersion of foreign investment activity is uniform. Panel B in the 
Table shows some encouraging growth in inward FDI for both regions in the present study 
although SSA lags behind the MENA region to a considerable extent. 
 
Table 1: FDI Inflows ($ billions) to SSA and MENA Regions (1970 – 1999) 
  Panel A FDI Inflows (1970 - 1979)       
Regions  Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum  
SSA 0.821 0.203 0.574 1.200 
MENA 0.335 1.476 -3.025 2.658 
  Panel B FDI Inflows (1980 - 1999)       
Regions  Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum  
SSA 2.883 2.625 0.252 9.105 
MENA 4.209 3.444 -3.077 11.674 
Source:  WDI (2015) 
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Table 2: FDI Inflows to Developing and Emerging Regions ($ billions) 
 Panel A      FDI Inflows (2000 – 2012) 
Regions Mean Std. Dev. Coef of Var. Minimum Maximum 
SSA 5.92 9.11 1.54 0.74 28.70 
East Asia & 
Pacific 66.30 104.00 1.57 1.39 328.00 
Latin America 
 & Caribbean 30.60 42.90 1.40 0.61 122.0 
MENA 13.00 27.10 1.40 -0.02 87.50 
Europe & Central 
Asia 190.00 286.00 2.08 4.31 852.00 
      
 Panel B      Growth in FDI Inflows for SSA and MENA Regions  
Regions 2000-2002  2003-2006 2007-2012 
SSA 11.040  15.524 31.736 
MENA 9.295  45.759 87.886 
Source:  WDI (2015) 
 
   FDI can play a critical role in providing capital for investment, high quality managerial 
skills and technology transfer.  It also creates employment, competition and productivity, 
transfer of modern technology, increases exports and enhances opportunities for growth and 
development, particularly in developing and emerging countries (Asiedu, 2002; Akinlo, 2004; 
Anyanwu and Yameogo, 2015a). Hence, it is important that Sub-Saharan Africa and the 
MENA region attract sustained foreign investment that can be used to assist in their 
development programmes and achieve higher levels of growth. Regrettably, as the data 
suggest, the regions are still at the lower end of the distribution of FDI inflows, which 
suggests that the reforms over the last couple of decades to attract FDI are still inadequate and 
have not attracted sufficient foreign investors. 
   This paper is largely motivated by Asiedu (2002), who examined the determinants of 
inward FDI to developing countries and questioned whether Africa is different from other 
potential investment destinations. However, the present study differs in a number of ways. 
Firstly, it focuses specifically on the determinants of FDI into the two least recipient regions.  
Both SSA and the MENA region have embarked upon trade liberalisation and reforms 
(adjustment programmes) at almost the same time, which makes them a more suitable for this 
study than the common approach of using a sample of developing countries with a huge 
disparity in characteristics, levels of trade liberalisation and reformsi. Secondly, it 
incorporates an investigation of the differences between the regions that arise from structural 
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and behavioural factors. In addition, the paper departs from much of the literature by using 
FDI per capita as the dependent variable as this allows for country size in a way that is not 
possible in the standard FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP. The use of FDI per capita will 
also avoid any bias in estimates that might arise due to the dominant importance of some large 
FDI recipient countries. Finally, comparing FDI flows between these regions contributes to 
the literature as while there are several shared characteristics some factors differ, which 
presents a platform for further incentives, reforms and complementarities.  
   Panel data estimation (fixed effects) was applied to a sample of 20 SSA and 11 MENA 
countries to determine the factors that influence FDI inflows. Findings suggest that trade 
openness, infrastructure development, and control of corruption positively influence FDI 
inflows. Surprisingly, rents from natural resources do not significantly influence FDI while 
inflation negatively affects FDI. In addition, the null hypothesis that both regions are not 
behaviourally and structurally different in terms of FDI determinants was rejected. When 
considered separately, SSA performed poorly compared with the MENA countries with the 
latter group attracting more FDI inflows. 
   The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature 
on the determinants of FDI. Section 3 develops the hypotheses to be tested. Section 4 
describes the variables and presents the preliminary data analysis. Section 5 specifies the 
models and reports the results followed by a discussion of the implications. The final section 
concludes. 
 
 2 Determinants of FDI 
a)   A brief review of the theoretical literature 
   Braunerhjelm and Svensson (1996) note the complex nature of the theoretical foundation of 
FDI and the literature is now fragmented across different areas of economics and international 
business. The earliest explanation of FDI inflows was from a neoclassical trade theory 
perspective. The Heckscher-Ohlin model assumed that since commodities vary in relative 
factor intensities and countries vary in relative factor abundance, capital will move to those 
countries where the return to capital is higher and the return to labour is lower (Jones, 1957; 
Hodd, 1967). Aliber (1970) extended the discussion of why capital moves across borders to 
include differences in the premium associated with exchange rate risk. Multinational firms in 
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countries with stronger currencies have an advantage over local firms in countries with 
weaker currencies since they can borrow capital with a lower exchange rate risk premium 
(Harvey, 1990).  
   The neoclassical approach was criticised because of its inability to clarify the nature of FDI 
flows and was replaced with the concept of oligopoly by Kindleberger (1969) and Hymer 
(1976) to provide a better explanation of why firms move across borders (Faeth, 2009). Thus, 
firms will only operate internationally when they possess certain advantages over local firms 
and where the market to explore these advantages is imperfect (Denisia, 2010). Buckley and 
Casson (1976) formulated a theory of multinational enterprise within a broad-based 
intellectual framework defined as internationalisation. This theory suggests that firms 
internalise markets by bringing the activities linked by the market under common ownership 
and control and move abroad if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs. Dunning 
(1979) combined these two concepts to create the eclectic paradigm, which is a combination 
of traditional trade economics and internalisation theory, which assumes that the likelihood of 
a firm investing abroad is based on three main factors: the degree to which a firm owns an 
asset that its competitors do not; whether the firm can benefit from selling or leasing these 
assets to other firms; and the level of rents that can be earned by exploiting these assets. In all 
cases, the locational characteristics of the host country are important, where these include 
market size/market growth, skilled labour, labour costs, synergistic/knowledge-related assets, 
availability/quality of infrastructure and natural resources (Dunning, 1998; Sun et al, 2002; 
Dunning, 1980). It is the locational aspects of the eclectic paradigm that separates this theory 
of FDI from the earlier market structure approaches based on oligopoly and monopoly (Faeth, 
2009). 
   In addition, national policies have had an impact on the determinants of FDI and these have 
tended to concentrate on attracting investment from abroad rather than emphasise differences 
in market structure. Hence, FDI can be regarded as a game between the multinational firm and 
the host government, complicated by the competition between host countries for inward FDI 
and various inducements and incentives are frequently offered with the intention of 
influencing the decision of the firm to invest in a particular location (Faeth, 2009). Exchange 
rates, tariffs and other trade barriers, taxes and the ease with which capital can be repatriated 
are some of the ways through which host governments influence FDI activity (Lim, 2002). In 
terms of negative influences, host governments that neglect to ensure a stable environment 
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can deter investment as political risk is a disincentive for firms wishing to undertake FDI 
(Khrawish and Siam, 2010).  
b) Empirical studies of FDI determinants 
   There is a vast empirical literature on FDI that includes developed and developing countries 
with interests on various sectors and for different time periods. However, the papers reviewed 
here focus solely on developing countries and regions as this is the context of the present 
study. The topics specific to developing countries tend to concentrate on the impact of 
corruption, rate of return, trade openness and natural resources with mixed findings on their 
relationship with FDI. Most emphasis has been on market size, education and economic 
growth. For example, Tsen (2005) attribute the positive significance of human capital to FDI 
to the fact that foreign investment does not only seek to reduce costs but also acquire access 
to technology and innovative capacity. Conversely, Oke et al (2012) find an insignificant 
relationship between education and FDI because of a lack of training and integration in the 
pool of human capital in their sample. Akin (2009) argued that their findings that FDI is not 
related to GDP per capita suggests that the small size of the market in low income countries is 
not an important determinant in the decision to invest internationally, although again this is 
sample specific. Sanfilippo (2010) argued that the significant relationship between FDI and 
gross national income shows that their study supports the market size hypothesis. Srinivasan 
(2011) claimed that the efforts by governments to increase economic growth and GDP per 
capita are successfully attracting market seeking FDI. In slight contrast, Anyanwu and 
Yameogo (2015a) found a U-shaped relationship between GDP per capita and FDI. They 
argued that for FDI to be positively related to GDP per capita, certain thresholds of GDP per 
capita should be attained.  
   With respect to infrastructure variables, there is further controversy. Adefeso and Agboola 
(2012), and Soremekun and Malgwi (2012) find that the positive and significant relationship 
between infrastructure development (mobile users) and FDI inflows is due to the fast 
penetration and adoption of mobile phones in the sample of developing countries they studied. 
However, Wadhwa and Sudhakara (2011) used internet access as a measure of infrastructure 
and found a negative relationship to FDI. This was justified by the fact that the developing 
countries in their sample have started using internet services extensively only in the last few 
years and hence are yet to have a positive influence on FDI.  
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   Finally, governance measures have been used extensively in FDI studies, and in particular 
with developing country samples. Woo and Heo (2009) find a negative relationship between 
FDI and corruption in a sample of developing Asian countries and suggested this was due to 
weak economic reforms, monopolistic power and rent-seeking behaviours of government 
officials, all of which deter investors. Political instability was found to have a significant and 
negative impact on FDI in a study by Buthe and Milner (2008).  This is explained by 
increases in the uncertainty of the political environment that heightens the risk of policy 
change and thus discourages FDI. Basemera et al, (2012) argue that the influence of free trade 
has been responsible for increased levels of FDI in a sample of sub-regional governments. A 
similar line of argument was also adopted by Anyanwu and Yameogo (2015b) following the 
positive relationship between FDI and trade openness in their study.   
 
3 Hypothesis Development 
   The framework for the hypotheses was developed mainly according to the ownership, 
location and internalisation (OLI) paradigm although with emphasis on locational factors. 
Country-level studies can only explore the locational aspect of the OLI paradigm. The 
literature on the location-specific variables of FDI suggests that infrastructure, human capital, 
natural resources, market size, inflation, corruption, and trade openness influence the patterns 
of FDI inflows (Tsen, 2005; Mijiyawa, 2015).   
H1. Larger market size/growth is positively associated with FDI inflows 
   The size of the market can be measured by GDP growth rate or GDP per capita. It is 
expected that a positive relationship will exist between market size and FDI inflows 
especially if FDI is motivated by market-seeking activities (Ranjan and Agrawal, 2011). 
However, while the growth rate of GDP or growth rate of per capita GDP is often argued to 
be a poor indicator for market seeking FDI activity in developing countries due to the fact that 
it is difficult to differentiate in the data the strategic imperative behind FDI, this study 
nevertheless hypothesises a positive relationship with FDI will be found (Akin, 2009). 
H2. FDI is positively related to rents from natural resources 
   Natural resources have been found to be important in attracting FDI, particularly in African 
continent (Asiedu, 2006; Nsiah and Wu, 2014). The regions under review in this study are 
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rich in natural resources and this is the sector that has historically attracted large amounts of 
FDI, especially the mineral and oil sectors. This study uses rents from natural resources as a 
percentage of GDP to capture the availability of these resources.   
 
H3. Infrastructure development stimulates FDI inflows 
   Available infrastructure increases productivity and thus the return on investment. Therefore 
a positive relationship between infrastructure and FDI is expected (Asiedu, 2002; Akin, 
2009). However, the quality of infrastructure in these countries is highly variable and a 
quality adjusted measure would be preferred. Unfortunately, data constraints limit the 
construction of this variable and in common with the literature, infrastructure availability and 
or development is used. This is proxied by per capita mobile phone users, as is established in 
similar studies.  
H4. Human capital has a positive impact on FDI inflows 
   An educated workforce has been recognised as an important determinant of FDI especially 
when firms are efficiency seeking. Srinivasan (2011) notes that a higher level of education 
can impact positively on FDI. The measure of human capital this study uses is the number of 
technical education students per capita. For some of the countries employed in this study, FDI 
is also attracted in technically oriented industries and not just in labour intensive countries. 
The use of technical education students is therefore justified because multinationals often seek 
to improve their technical efficiency particularly in the face of increased competitive 
pressures. Furthermore, technical knowledge available in a country can positively impact on 
FDI flows because innovation creates new demands for raw materials leading to FDI in their 
extraction and production. Such technical knowledge base can be supported through 
investments in skills acquisition. For example, large investments in education and training 
increased the stock of skilled labour in some Asia-Pacific countries and thus, helped increase 
their share of global FDI (Addison and Heshmati. 2003).  
H5. Trade openness has a positive impact on FDI inflows 
   Countries with greater levels of trade openness and with more links to the world economy 
attract foreign capital and welcome overseas investment (Srinivasan, 2011; Owusu-Antwi, 
2012). Using the established measure of openness (exports plus imports as a share of GDP), 
9 
 
the study hypothesises a positive relationship with FDI. Evidence of this has been provided by 
numerous empirical studies for the regions under review. This is particularly important 
because both SSA and MENA have embarked on adjustment programmes and trade 
liberalisation over the past two decades and few barriers to trade remain in these regions. 
 
H6. There is a positive relationship between control of corruption and FDI inflows 
   Corruption can create a considerable barrier to investment. Corruption impedes investment 
directly and indirectly (Habib and Zurawicki; Al-Sadig, 2009). Although, several countries in 
this study are not known for their high levels of control of corruption (Owusu-Antwi, 2012), 
this study nevertheless hypothesises there is a positive relationship between control of 
corruption and FDI as the latter can reduce uncertainty in investment activities.   
H7. Foreign investors are less likely to invest in countries with high levels of inflation 
   One of the indicators of stable macroeconomic environment is price stability. Foreign 
investors are often deterred by high inflation because it erodes their return on investment, 
raises uncertainty and shows the inability of host government to implement sound 
macroeconomic policies that are conducive to business activities (Azam, 2010).   
 
4 Sample and Data 
 a) Sample countries 
   Table 3 shows the sample of countries used in the analysis. The initial sample included all 
SSA and MENA countries but due to missing data or because some of the values were 
outliers that would bias the estimates, a few countries were removed. This also guided the 
chosen time period for the study. Regarding the outliers, preliminary regression plots of the 
standardised residuals against the fitted values confirms that Bahrain and Qatar are outliers 
and thus were excluded from the sample in the subsequent analysis. Bahrain and Qatar are 
likely to be outliers because of their high GDP per capita and thus they do not fit with the 
developing country profile of the remainder of the sample. 
 
Table 3 Sample Countries  
MENA Region Algeria, Bahrain*, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Qatar*, Saudi 
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Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen 
SSA Region Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, 
Sudan and Uganda 
 Note: * These countries are outliers and excluded from the analysis 
 
 
b) Variable description 
   Given the widely different sizes of the countries under review it is important that the 
variables used take account of population size in order that comparisons are valid and useful.  
In addition, levels of development are not constant and some countries have higher income 
levels than others. Thus, the majority of variables in the modelling are considered on the basis 
of percentage of total population or values per capita. Data on FDI inflows, pupils in technical 
education, and mobile users are expressed in per capita terms. The data were obtained from 
the World Development Indicators, UNCTAD, and the World Bank Governance Indicators. 
Data definitions and sources are in Table 4.  
 
 
Table 4 Variable Definitions 
FDI inflows per capita FDI inflows by country divided by the total  host country population ($) (UNCTAD 2015) 
   % of Population in vocational or technical 
education 
% of population enrolled in technical and vocational education 
(WDI, 2015) 
      
Resource Rent 
Total natural resources rent are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, 
coal rents, mineral rents and forest rents as a % of GDP (WDI, 2015) 
  
    
% Population of Mobile Phone Users % population using mobile telephones either on a post-paid or prepaid basis, proxies infrastructure (WDI, 2015) 
Trade Openness Sum of imports plus exports as % of GDP, proxies the degree of liberalisation, as in Srinivasan, 2011  
   
Control of Corruption 
Measures the extent to which public power for personal gain is 
controlled (WGI, 2015). Ranges from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) 
rank.  
      
Inflation Annual % change in the cost of consumer goods and services  (WDI, 2015) 
     
 
GDP per Capita 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear 
population (WDI, 2015)  
  
  
11 
 
 
 
c) Preliminary data analysis 
   Table 5 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the estimation. It is clear 
that the MENA region has a higher level of development at the mean, with many values 
greater than SSA. In particular, the extent of FDI, human capital, infrastructure development, 
resource rents, and GDP per capita are greater in the MENA sample. The mean trade 
openness is similar although the SSA sample has a much higher dispersion. The institutional 
governance variables, that is, control of corruption in this study is higher in the MENA region 
although the differences are not great. At the mean, inflation is lower in the MENA region 
including the variation from the mean. Correlation coefficients are listed in Table 6. The 
coefficients show no high collinearity between the variables. 
 
Table 5 Descriptive Statistics 
                         Sample Countries                             Total                 MENA                 SSA 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
                  
FDI Inflow per Capita ($ US) 79.402 170.693 -331.306 1458.000 151.736 251.108 39.618 78.575 
GDP per Capita 3350.042 7233.623 108.015 56366.570 7275.122 10921.180 1191.248 1624.291 
Resource Rent (% of GDP) 19.402 17.599 0.256 71.605 27.878 19.744 14.740 14.336 
Infrastructure Development (% of Mobile Users) 37.079 41.447 0.019 193.453 57.731 50.423 25.720 30.122 
% of Population in Technical Education 0.546 0.798 0.012 4.599 1.102 1.081 0.241 0.291 
Trade Openness 74.641 34.157 19.356 202.850 76.786 22.025 73.461 39.255 
Control of Corruption 37.434 21.222 0.957 85.854 41.208 19.992 35.358 21.627 
Inflation 9.375 20.108 -9.798 324.997 5.835 6.405 11.322 24.380 
 
 
Table 6 Correlation Matrix 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 FDI Inflow per Capita ($ US) 1.000 
       2 GDP per Capita 0.484 1.000 
      3 Resource Rent (% of GDP) 0.259 0.482 1.000 
     4 Infrastructure Development (% of Mobile Users) 0.600 0.590 0.233 1.000 
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5 % of Population in Technical Education 0.121 0.108 0.317 0.188 1.000 
   6 Trade Openness 0.234 0.119 0.103 0.156 -0.028 1.000 
  7 Control of Corruption 0.244 0.324 -0.334 0.276 -0.069 0.215 1.000 
 8 Inflation -0.013 -0.078 0.200 -0.096 -0.050 0.159 -0.219 1.000 
 
 
5. Models, estimation and results 
a) Panel specification 
   The models use a balanced panel of 20 SSA and 11 MENA countries. The data are annual 
for the period 2000 – 2012. As already identified above, this was mainly due to data 
availability for some of the variables. Fixed effects estimation was used as the random effects 
estimator was rejected based on the Hausman test. Panel models are valuable for a number of 
reasons.  Firstly, panel data allow both the cross-section and the time series aspects of the data 
to contribute to the parameter estimates. Secondly, panel data suggest that countries are 
heterogeneous. Time series and cross-section studies not controlling for this heterogeneity run 
the risk of obtaining biased results. Not accounting for country-specific differences in economic 
or behavioural assumptions, such as countries operating under different political systems or 
more or less restrictive regulations, can cause serious mis-specification in the models. Thirdly, it 
may be important to incorporate dynamic effects and these models provide a means to study the 
dynamics of adjustment (Greene, 1997). 
   Given the differences between the regions as highlighted by the descriptive statistics 
(summarised in Table 5), it is important that the models take into consideration possible 
heterogeneity across countries in order to reduce the risk of obtaining biased estimates. The 
fixed effects model data used also allows the intercept to vary for each individual country but 
still assumes that the slope coefficients are constant across the sample. The estimating 
equation can be expressed 
iti  v+ µ++= itiit Xy βα     (1) 
where y is FDI inflows per capita in country i at time t, X is a matrix of independent variables 
and α and β are coefficients to be estimated.  µi and vit represent the decomposed disturbance 
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term where µit are country specific effects and vit are random errors distributed (Gujarati, 
2004). 
   Equation (1) was first estimated with and without the SSA dummy. With respect to 
statistical tests, the Chow Test showed that SSA and the MENA countries are behaviourally 
and structurally different based on the F test and critical values. Given these statistical 
differences, the significant variables were interactedii with the SSA dummy to establish any 
differences in marginal effects. These behavioural and structural differences could also have 
accounted for the differences at the means and variations already presented in the preliminary 
data analysis above.  
   In the specification tests, all models are acceptable. A Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg Test 
for heteroskedasticity indicated the presence of heteroskedasticity and therefore robust 
standard errors were used to relax the assumptions that the errors were both independent and 
identically distributed. The GMM results were not reported in this study as the estimates and 
instruments were inefficient and inconsistent. The inconsistency and inefficiency were not 
surprising considering that GMM fits better for panel with large numbers of cross-section (N) 
and small time-series (T). However, the fixed effects technique used is known to control for 
possible heterogeneity. Tests also revealed no statistical mis-specification of the model and no 
omitted variable bias. Thus, the conclusion can be drawn that the results obtained from the 
fixed effects estimation are consistent and not spurious. 
 
b) Results and discussion 
   The results are in Tables 7 and 8. The SSA dummy is negative and significant. This implies 
that all things being equal, the SSA region on average receives less FDI compared to the 
MENA region. H1 tested the importance of market size. The GDP per capita is positive and 
significant. Coefficient of the interaction between SSA dummy and GDP per capita was 
negative and significant. This shows that marginal effect of GDP per capita on FDI inflows is 
less in SSA than the MENA region. To further support the result of the interaction, the 
estimated partial coefficient of GDP per capita in SSA was insignificant compared to the 
positive and significant effect in MENA. These findings most likely reflect that the higher 
levels of disposable income in the MENA region attract FDI for market seeking opportunities. 
H2 tested the impact of rents from natural resources on FDI inflows. Surprisingly, this was 
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insignificantly related to FDI. These findings were similar to those of Asiedu and Lien (2011) 
and can be justified with similar arguments. Huge rents generated from natural resources can 
lead to the appreciation of local currency and thus can diminish the competitiveness of 
exports. This results in the crowding out of investments in non-natural resource tradable 
sectors. Some of the countries in the sample often attract huge FDI inflows into their resource 
sectors and thus, while the exploration of natural resources initially comes with high capital 
outlay, continued operations within that sector are usually accompanied by smaller cash 
flows. Also, countries with a significant share of natural resources in total merchandise 
exports are more prone to external shocks since they are weak in trade diversification. These 
shocks create macroeconomic instability and can lead to the decline in FDI.
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Table 7:  Fixed Effects Estimations (Robust standard errors) 
FDI Inflow per Capita ($ US) 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed  
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
        Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
GDP per Capita 0.014* 0.014* 0.014* 0.013* 0.014* 0.013* 0.014* 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Resource Rent (% of GDP) -0.137 -0.137 0.119 0.294 -0.554 -0.099 -0.334 
 
(0.965) (0.965) (0.987) (1.150) (0.893) (0.968) (1.048) 
Infrastructure Development (% of Mobile Users) 2.199*** 2.199*** 2.379*** 2.284*** 1.795*** 2.203*** 2.249*** 
 
(0.687) (0.687) (0.687) (0.715) (0.661) (0.681) (0.686) 
% of Population in Technical Education -37.269 -37.269 -16.384 -27.983 -44.698 -36.631 -42.864 
 
(30.798) (30.798) (29.431) (34.563) (32.431) (30.222) (32.913) 
Trade Openness 1.969*** 1.969*** 1.628*** 1.893*** 6.052*** 1.974*** 1.996*** 
 
(0.479) (0.479) (0.497) (0.489) (1.302) (0.475) (0.480) 
Control of Corruption 66.477** 66.477** 68.859** 69.932** 42.325 58.554 62.978* 
 
(33.589) (33.589) (33.564) (34.208) (30.529) (77.767) (35.235) 
Inflation -0.606*** -0.606*** -0.446** -0.553** -0.517** -0.610*** -0.899*** 
 
(0.229) (0.229) (0.227) (0.232) (0.236) (0.229) (0.325) 
SSA Dummy  -199.706*** 
     
 
 (67.821) 
     GDP per Capita * SSA 
  
-0.031** 
    
   
(0.014) 
    Infrastructure Development (% of Mobile Users) * SSA 
   
-0.513 
   
    
(0.579) 
   Trade Openness * SSA 
    
-4.944*** 
  
     
(1.342) 
  Control of Corruption * SSA 
     
12.212 
 
      
(74.842) 
 Inflation * SSA 
      
0.368 
       
(0.384) 
Cons 47.14627 -53.569 -91.259 -82.554 
-
292.237*** -60.238 -16.061 
 
29.12621 (64.803) (67.713) (77.546) (99.915) (71.414) (79.383) 
No. of Obs. 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 
F Stat 13.25 7.77 7.71 7.62 8.52 7.61 7.64 
Prob. > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R-Squared 0.4097 0.6650 0.6713 0.6664 0.6865 0.6651 0.6655 
        
                       Robust Standard Errors are in Parentheses; *Significance at the 10% Level; **Significance at the 5% Level; ***Significance at the 1% Level 
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 Table 8: Marginal Effects of the Significant Variables 
Variables MENA SSA 
GDP per Capita 0.014* -0.017 
 
(0.007) (0.015) 
Infrastructure Development (% of Mobile Users) 2.284*** 1.771** 
 
(0.715) (0.713) 
Trade Openness 6.052*** 1.108*** 
 
(1.302) (0.401) 
Control of Corruption 58.554 70.765*** 
 
(77.767) (21.009) 
Inflation -0.899*** -0.530** 
  (0.325) (0.257) 
Robust Standard Errors are in Parentheses; *Significance at the 10% Level; **Significance at the 5% Level; ***Significance at the 1% Level 
 
   Infrastructure development is clearly important as a determinant of FDI inflows and it is 
positive and significant although SSA has a lower elasticity overall than the MENA region. 
The interaction between infrastructure development and the SSA dummy was negative and 
the estimated partial coefficient was higher for MENA countries compared to SSA countries. 
The findings are expected and support the literature on FDI, particularly on the relationship 
between infrastructure and investment from developed to developing countries. The impact of 
human capital as a predictor of FDI was tested in H4. The results showed that technical 
education has an insignificant effect on FDI. The results suggest that human capital in these 
regions has not yet reached the required threshold in technical education to stimulate 
efficiency and attract skill-seeking FDI. A test of H5 showed that trade openness is positive 
and significant although SSA has a lower elasticity. That is, the result of the interaction 
between the SSA dummy and trade openness was negative and significant. These findings 
nevertheless, demonstrate the importance of trade openness in attracting FDI. 
   Results also showed that control of corruption has a positive influence on FDI inflows, 
however the marginal effect of corruption control on FDI is significantly higher in SSA 
countries compared to MENA countries. The result of the interaction between control of 
corruption and the SSA dummy is positive and the partial coefficient is positive but 
insignificant for the MENA countries. These findings support the empirical evidence that 
controlling for corruption can be a means through which FDI can be positively influenced. 
Foreign investors perceive SSA countries to be very corrupt and thus, genuine efforts against 
corruption will have the most impact on investment in SSA. The impact of Inflation was 
negative and significant. The partial coefficient shows that the negative impact of inflation 
will be higher in the MENA region compared to the SSA region. Inflation creates 
macroeconomic instability, reduces buying power, and erodes the return on investment.  
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6. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
   This study investigates the determinants of FDI inflows into two of the least recipient 
regions, SSA and MENA. The findings reveal that infrastructure development, trade openness 
and control of corruption encourage FDI into these regions. On the other hand, inflation deters 
FDI while rents from natural resources do not significantly attract FDI. Some of these 
findings are not consistent with the stated hypotheses. The analyses also considered whether 
the regions are behaviourally and structurally different and if so, how they compare in their 
FDI determinants. The results confirmed differences between the two regions and that the 
marginal benefits from increases in the quality of FDI determinants will be less for SSA 
countries compared to the MENA countries. 
   A number of policy implications follow from these findings. First, trade openness and 
control of corruption are very important determinants of FDI and thus, efforts targeted at 
reducing corruption and improving trade policies should be seriously pursued. Second, since 
rent from resources does not significantly influence FDI, the SSA and MENA regions should 
encourage more trade diversification by pursuing policies that will increase the 
competitiveness of the non-resource tradable sectors. Third, serious attention should be paid 
to technical education because countries with high levels of low-skilled labour are less likely 
to be attractive to foreign investors focussing on high value-added industries or FDI inflows 
motivated by efficiency seeking. This is also important because of the spillovers that flow to 
host country firms from FDI in high skilled sectors that contribute more value added than 
those from low-skilled sectors. Finally, all things being equal, SSA countries will attract less 
FDI compared to MENA countries and thus it is crucial that countries and sub-regional blocs 
in SSA direct their efforts towards programmes that improve their image as international 
partners. Therefore they should introduce credible policies targeted at restoring confidence 
and maintaining global relationships, thus countering the negative perception of SSA as a 
region. 
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i For further details that African countries embarked on adjustment programmes in the 1980s see, Nsouli and 
Zulu, 1985; Campbell and Loxley, 1989. 
ii An interaction is formed as of a product off two (or more) variables. An important application of the interaction 
variables is that it allows for differences in the slopes of two regression lines. For further reading, see (Dielman, 
2005). 
 
